Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts

2024-10-03

Resistance to AI Automation will crumble

And I don't mean The Resistance to Terminators.

Al automation promises to revolutionize white-collar or office work. Some think there’s plenty of resistance against quick AI adoption and so there won’t be major negative societal disruptions. I’ve come to believe that resistance will crumble.

Legal and copyright issues could slow AI down, but not for long.


AI generated code may be hard to accept into proprietary code bases due to legal uncertainty, e.g., copyright issues.  For example, the Google v Oracle Java lawsuit started in 2010 and reached conclusion in the Supreme Court in 2021.  That’s 11 years of legal uncertainty over whether there was copied code.

Having said that, Google kept using the disputed technology through those years of litigation.  There are ways around legal issues like that I presume.  And the legal cases against AI are already underway as in the Github Copilot lawsuit [1], so the clock is already ticking — and currently, the AI side is winning [2].

It feels there's some amount of inevitability at play too in terms of resolving the copyright issues.  The actors' guild has agreed to a contract allowing limited AI usage with major media companies. OpenAI is securing deals with media companies to train and utilize their copyrighted materials. The writing is on the wall, and AI is writing it.

People and companies are resistant to change, but new folks will jump ahead


Some say "The future is already here; it's just unevenly distributed" (William Gibson).

One reason that happens is that status quo lowers risk.  If you're Apple and if you have AI that can do the work of half your software development workforce, do you layoff 50% of SDEs?  No.  No one has the risk tolerance for that big a move all at once.  What if you were wrong?  What if the wrong automation tech is used, or the people you hire to manage that get it wrong?  Betting "all in" on a single roll of the dice is too risky.

Not without an external crisis, at least.

The oil and gas industry used to employ a lot of people.  Until oil price crashed and belt tightening resulted in lots of layoffs and automation.  Those jobs are never coming back because they were automated away [11].  But without the price crash, the amount or severity of layoffs might not have been as bad.

After all, one way for a manager to get promoted is by managing more people and a bigger budget.  So the status quo of using more people than automation is a self-interested move.  A crisis like a big oil price crash is required to shake that status quo loose.

But new companies don't have the same status quo problem.  Old companies will either succeed or fail.  New startups with come in with automation and AI baked in to reduce cost, extend their funding runway, and to get product market fit faster.

Old Tech will eventually come around to automation anyway


People say that it's normal for FAANG type companies to lose 5% or more tech workers every year for various reasons [3].  Attrition, eliminating teams of projects that get cancelled, "unregretted attrition", etc.  Depending on the speed of AI automation progress, old tech companies can just keep up with 5% unregretted attrition each year to slowly turnover the company to AI.

Some might say it's already started since 2022 [4].

And for those old stuffy companies who don't come around fast enough to automation?  They can always turn from being an engineering company into a financial engineering firm, like Siemens, IBM or GE.

I’m kidding! Slightly.  But just because Air Canada will probably think twice about using AI for customer service after that lawsuit [8], that doesn’t mean they won’t outsource to an AI customer service startup that’s also willing to defend them against lawsuits.

Lump of Labour fallacy is about the whole economy, not a single sector


Some say don't worry about AI automation producing negative societal disruptions in the form of making everyone unemployed because Lump of Labour is a fallacy [6].

The Lump of Labour fallacy misconception is that there's only a fixed amount of work to be done, so don't worry about automation taking work away from people!  There'll always be more work invented by people to do!

Some would say this time is different because AI could do that newly invented work too.  But even without this AI-everywhere angle, you have to see that the type of work may be different.

When manufacturing and software development work gets automated, what new work is there to do?  Those workers can re-skill into making TikTok influencing channels?

Some say “yes, of course”, but there's just no guarantee that the new work would be "better" (e.g. higher abstraction of code, safer workplace, higher paying, improved quality of life at work).  It could be worse or more dangerous.  As climate change gets worse, maybe those displaced tech workers can re-skill into forest fire fighting?  I doubt non-robotic LLMs can do that.

Jevons Paradox applies to things people want, not things people are ambivalent about or worse


Some say don't worry about AI automation making office/tech/programming workers unemployed because Jevons says greater efficiency will induce more demand for software, etc. [6]

Jevons Paradox states that increased efficiency leads to increased consumption.  i.e. as X becomes more efficient, more X will be used. Substitute X with:

  • Oil
  • Gas
  • Electricity
  • Microsoft Office


Look, people want dogs and cats.  But generally speaking, people aren't into wanting software developers and assembly line workers.

USA is manufacturing more than ever, but is employing fewer manufacturing workers than ever. Maybe AI will let us substitute "manufacturing" with "software developing" in that sentence.

Consumers want the goods, not the people producing them (see: offshoring).  If AI can produce it cheaper with fewer humans involved and without animal testing, then consumers would want that instead (mainly because it's cheaper).

So at best, Jevons says people will want more software and apps than ever before because they'll get more efficient with AI.  But nothing says that the code has to be written by humans.

In fact, we've seen this last point before.  Practically no one writes the assembly code that those software requires written to work — compilers write that automatically for us since decades ago.

Fortunately, assembly code programmers could easily up-skill to higher level languages like Java.  With AI, coders may have to up-skill to higher level languages like English, and compete with all the non-coders who can already English better than them.

Software developers will work at higher levels of abstractions.  Yes, and so can everyone else


Some say software developers shouldn't worry about automation taking their jobs, because at best AI can spit out code given some architecture and specifications for problems that the human software developer has to write up into prompts.  So the human SDE can now work at a higher level of abstraction, work at system design levels and above, double check the code that AI produced to make sure there's no hallucinations.

Sure, yes.  But what evidence is there that BSc graduates with education in algorithms and data structures can write those prompts better than, e.g., BA philosophy graduates who trained in close-reading, analyzing, and writing highly technical English in all their Analytic Philosophy classes?

There's also a lot of LLB lawyers who are underemployed in the legal or adjacent fields doing paralegal or repetitive property conveyancing work.  Maybe some of them can do this AI software development prompting better than CS/SDE graduates?

In fact, we've seen this broadening (or democratizing) of a labour field before.  It used to be highly technical and challenging work to do special event photography.  You have to get the lighting, shutter speed, and aperture just right or else you'll miss the moment, or waste and run out of expensive film.  Digital SLR photography and big inexpensive memory cards means many with an eye for beautiful photos can now do wedding photography, take 1000s of photos, then choose the best 50 afterwards.  Or just fix it in "post" with Photoshop.

This means sky-high compensations or job security will come down, if not in one field (tech), then maybe in any field that's at risk of AI automation (all white collar or office jobs).

AI is a bubble, until it’s not


The last few points focused more on software development, but that’s a canary in the coal mine.  Some say software development is more resistant to AI automation because it’s already in the business of automation [7].  But that just means that if (since?) software engineering labour is at risk, then many other fields are also at risk too.

Some say AI is like crypto.  It’s all hype and a bubble run like or by some of the same personalities.  But that’s a useless comparison.  Can you, in 1999, tell if the internet is a bubble or not based on how tulips were a bubble [9]?  They’re just not the same.  And at least with AI there are clear and present use-cases, no AGI required.

So forget AGI.  Resistance to automation will crumble.  There's too much money to be made in automating even just 10% [10] of the white-collar or office work labour market, in whole or in part, outright or by “just” improving human efficiency.  That's the "killer app" of AI.

Don’t focus so much on the automating a worker outright-in-whole part.  Instead, focus on the replacement in-part, by “just” improving human efficiency, part.  E.g. Self-checkout didn’t eliminate “cashiers”, but allows one supervisor to do the work of (say) three cashiers.

How much profit can this “killer app" make that would justify the (non) bubble?  I lazily checked with Meta AI and it says:

  • telemarketing and public opinion researchers (including call center representatives) in the USA in 2020 probably had compensation of about $100B
  • software developers (including applications and systems software developers) employed in the USA in 2020 made about $200B
  • office managers, supervisors, support and assistants employed in the USA in 2020 made about $200B


That’s $500B right there. So by automating even just 10%, it’d take just 10 years to fill the $500 billion dollar revenue gap [5].  That percentage will go up, the addressable market is not just the USA, and there are many other labour fields to automate than those.

That’s why I think AI adoption will be quicker and there’ll be more negative societal disruptions coming up.  We can’t all re-skill to fight forest fires.

EDIT: To clarify, I don't mean for sure tech or any other jobs will definitely get decimated by AI efficiency gains.  It's just that quoting "Jevons" or "Lump of Labour" isn't a knock-out against that possibility.  The analysis has to be deeper than just invoking those, by now, thought-stopping thoughts.

Let me volunteer one possibility, for example, AI makes coding jobs 10% more efficient, meaning cost of labour is reduced.  Because cost of software production goes down, consumers want more apps, so much more than the 10% efficiency gains allow that more humans developers are needed.  This is the classic rebound effect in Jevons.  Notice it requires consumers to want so much more apps that it more than offsets the 10% efficiency gains — there is no guarantee it rebounds that much!

EDIT 2: Also, jobs getting decimated by AI efficiency gains is not necessarily bad!  Machines decimated coal mining jobs, which is bad for jobs, but given there are better alternate jobs, it was great for the health and safety of would-be coal miners!


[1]: https://www.artificialintelligence-news.com/news/openai-and-microsoft-lawsuit-github-copilot/

[2]: https://www.developer-tech.com/news/judge-dismisses-majority-github-copilot-copyright-claims/

[3]: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon/internal-amazon-documents-shed-light-on-how-company-pressures-out-6-of-office-workers/

[4]: https://layoffs.fyi

[5]: https://blog.carsoncheng.ca/2024/07/re-500b-ai-revenue-expectations-gap.html

[6]: AI and the automation of work. https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2023/7/2/working-with-ai

[7]: I believe Yann LeCun said something like that but I can’t find the source.

[8]: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/air-canada-chatbot-lawsuit-1.7116416

[9]: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tulip_mania

[10]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41465081 - study says there's a 26.08% increase in productivity with AI, and more specifically a 27% to 39% for junior level and 8% to 13% at senior level.  So my "10%" guess wasn't too bad?

[11]: https://www.parklandinstitute.ca/job_creation_or_job_loss - “the Big Four are leading the push to automate away even more jobs in the coming years … The Alberta oil and gas industry employed 25,788 fewer workers in 2021 than in 2014 (a 15.5% reduction)”

2024-10-02

Labour Automation vs Growth

Automation in oil and gas reduced labour needed to extract and produce oil. Oil as a product is not a platform-platform. Oil usage cannot induce demand for ever more oil by being a medium for platforms that can recursively host more platforms of products. Because oil does not induce exponential demand, then automation has a good chance of reducing labour down.

The flip side is that platform-platforms can recursively host more platforms of products. So platform-platforms has a chance to induce exponential demand, and so while automation reduces labour per unit produced, on the whole the exponential demand for units can balance out if not even increase labour required industry-wide.

C compilers are not platform-platforms. Compilers in general basically eliminated all assembly programming labour. The reason there are more programmers now than when assembly language reigned supreme is not because compiler automation freed up labour for more creative things. The reason is more because that other platform-platforms like the internet and operating systems induced exponential demand for software.

Other examples of automation that are not platform-platforms and in fact eliminated a lot of labour include:

  • Manufacturing automation
  • Bookbinding automation (replaced by printing presses)
  • Telephone switchboard automation (replaced by digital systems)


Jevons Paradox states that increased efficiency leads to increased consumption.  i.e. as X becomes more efficient, more X will be used. Substitute X with:

  • Oil
  • Gas
  • Electricity
  • Microsoft Office


But software developers? Or assembly line workers? USA is manufacturing more than ever, but is employing fewer manufacturing workers than ever. Maybe AI will allow us to  substitute "manufacturing" with "software developing" in that sentence.

Jevon's Paradox "works" only for items that consumers actually want. If extreme environmentalism "won", gas usage would go down no matter how efficient gas engines get. If coal-powered SUVs became unreasonably ultra trendy, coal use would go up regardless of how inefficient coal was.

Software development and manufacturing workers are not goods that consumers want. They want what's produced. And if AI can produce it cheaper with fewer humans involved and without animal testing, then consumers would want that instead.

2024-10-01

The Internet is a Platform-Platform. AI is not.

AI is not like the internet or computer operating system software in terms of its economic impact.

The latter two are platform-platforms while AI is not.

A platform is a kind of medium.  e.g. YouTube is a platform for videos.

Some platforms are special in that they are recursively platforms for platforms.

Computer hardware are platform-platforms.  They're a medium for various single purpose built software, of course, but more importantly they are also a medium for different operating systems (OSs).

OSs like macOS or Windows are platform-platforms.  The most easiest and reductive way to see this is that you can virtualize and run macOS on Windows, and vice versa.  More substantively, these OSs can run internet or web browsers.

Internet and web browsers and the physical internetwork they connect to form platform-platforms.  Different businesses run on the web, but more importantly, the web or internet are a medium for running app stores on desktop and mobile devices.

Is AI a platform-platform?  What is it a medium for?  Does this medium support a platform recursively?

Or is AI more like a sufficiently smart general compiler?  AI can automate existing products and workflows, but it isn't a medium that will enable more products exponentially by carrying platforms on platforms … on platforms.

Others have noted similar ideas.  e.g. AI is a feature, not a product.  Actually, it's worse: "AI is a tech to enable a feature, not a feature in itself" [1].

Or that current AI are automated "infinite interns that can write anything for you" [2].  But follow that train of thought to the conclusion that a human-level current-generation AI would be an actually-human intern and now wonder: since when do human interns (even an infinity of them) form a medium that can be a platform for platforms?  (… unless you use them like transistors, to do computation as a human powered Turing machine, just to argue they can do what actual computers can already do.)

This distinction between products and platforms vs platform-platforms can inform us on the economic impact of AI on society.

 

 [1]: ( https://www.threads.net/@benedictevans/post/C8C00e5OZBT )

 [2]: ( https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2023/7/2/working-with-ai )

 

2024-07-15

Re: AI heatwave

I’m trying to make sense of “The AI summer” [1].

OpenAI’s ChatGPT had a meteoric rise in popularity not because the technology works (it does, for some reasonable definition of “works”) but rather the foundation is there for viral spread because:

> a lot of this is ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ - OpenAI didn’t have to wait for people to buy devices or for telcos to build DSL or 3G

> ChatGPT is just a website or an app, and … it could ride on all of the infrastructure we’ve built over the last 25 years. So a huge number of people went off to try it last year.


But current AI’s problem is that no one knows what to do with it:

> The problem is that most of them haven’t been back. … most people played with it once or twice, or go back only every couple of weeks

> On one hand, getting a quarter to a third of the developed world’s population to try a new product in 18 months is very hard. But on the other, most people who tried it didn’t see how it was useful.


Current AI is more R&D than basic foundational research but it is still more R than D, and it’s still far from being COTS [3] products:

> Accenture … Last summer it proudly announced that it had already done $300m of ‘generative AI’ work for clients… and that it had done 300 projects. Even an LLM can divide 300 by 300 - that’s a lot of pilots, not deployment.

> As a lot of people have now pointed out, all of that adds up to a stupefyingly large amount of capex (and a lot of other investment too) being pulled forward for a technology that’s mostly still only in the experimental budgets.

> an LLM by itself is not a product - it’s a technology that can enable a tool or a feature, and it needs to be unbundled or rebundled into new framings, UX and tools to be become useful. That takes even more time.



It took 8 years (to approx. June 2022) for cloud adoption to touch 25%. It took that long for cloud adoption expected-in-3-years to just pass 40% [2].

It took 2 more years and a pandemic (to approx. January 2024) for cloud adoption to get to about 30%. It took that long for cloud adoption expected-in-3-years to get near 50%:

> If you work in tech, cloud is old and boring and done, but it’s still only a third or so of enterprise workflows

> it took more than 20 years for 20% of US retail to move online



Gen AI and LLMs are here to stay but it’ll still take many years to decades for it to spread everywhere and displace existing technologies and labor.



[1]: https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2024/7/9/the-ai-summer

[2]: https://www.ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2023/7/2/working-with-ai

[3]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_off-the-shelf

2024-07-12

RE: $500B AI revenue expectations gap

They say there is a $500B "gap between the revenue expectations implied by the AI infrastructure build-out, and actual revenue growth in the AI ecosystem" [1].

Part 1


Given the business that Sequoia Cap is in, it should not be surprising that they’d say things like:

> Investment incineration… a lot of people lose a lot of money during speculative technology waves. It’s hard to pick winners, but much easier to pick losers

> Winners vs. losers… there are always winners during periods of excess infrastructure building. AI is likely to be the next transformative technology wave… lt will cause harm primarily to investors.


i.e. invest right and you’d capture a huge amount of value. Invest wrong and you’d be burning your money. So do investments with us.

Part 2


What I found interesting is the point about there being a:

> $500B … gap between the revenue expectations [$600B] implied by the AI infrastructure build-out, and actual revenue growth in the AI ecosystem [$100B] … that needs to be filled for each year of CapEx at today’s levels [GPU $150B, “Data Center Facility Build and Cost to Operate” $150B (they seem to have included OpEx in their “CapEx” figure)]


This means there’s either some amazing AI killer apps that will make $500B in sales or some AI investments will get incinerated.

Investment incineration "will cause harm primarily to investors" [1] — Nvidia, the data center builders, facility operators, and power companies will all have gotten paid for the work they will do — but I wonder what are the broader implications of the $500B revenue expectations gap.

Is it — the investments, not necessarily the GPT/LLM tech — irrational exuberance?  How much of today’s Big Tech valuation is driven by it?  How sensitive is it to interest rates?  Notice this "bubble", if it is one, is not occurring during a ZIRP [3] period.

It seems AI startups aren’t the ones building AI data centers — "much of the incremental data center build-out is coming from big tech companies" [2].  So startups seem less affected by that cost.

But actually 50% of the $500B revenue expectations gap is “software margin” — that’s the margin earned by “The end user of the GPU—for example, Starbucks, X, Tesla, Github Copilot or a new startup” [2].

Which means when some of the $500B expected revenue doesn’t show up, it’ll be hitting the AI startups' margins.

Now remember the other 50% is “CapEx”: Nvidia GPU, and “Data Center Facility Build and Cost to Operate”.  And remember that Nvidia, the data center builders, facility operators, and power companies will all have gotten paid for the work they will do — because they don’t work for free or for startups' equity.  So it seems they won’t have their margins squeezed.

But doesn’t that also mean when some of the $500B expected revenue doesn’t show up, it’ll be hitting the Big Tech AI data center’s top line?

I don't know enough to know what will happen, but it seems some amount of AI Investment cooling will hit AI startups and Big Tech's AI data center buildout.  Big Tech has been and remains profitable, and their GPUs are paid for, so it'll mainly change their product priorities and revenue forecasts (and thus stock price?).  AI startups, however...

But perhaps, just in time, the Fed's interest rates will go down for unrelated reasons.

[1]: https://www.sequoiacap.com/article/ais-600b-question/
[2]: https://www.sequoiacap.com/article/follow-the-gpus-perspective/
[3]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero_interest-rate_policy

2015-07-28

Trust and Other Elements of Collaboration




In the previous post, I examined through a parable comparing two different kinds of group decision making strategies: (1) "freely" throwing out suggestions, vs (2) veto-or-not the other group member's choice.

From that, we talked about communication in terms of information content and how it affects whether we can really get to know a person better (as a friend, let's say) in what is a repeated game (as in game theory, or micro-economics).

Now, we can also talk about what it means to collaborate, not just cooperate, but arrive at decisions via collaboration.  That's what we'll talk about presently.

See, both strategies above can be cooperative.  In fact, the veto-or-not strategy could be seen as an extreme form of cooperation via deferring totally to the other party unless the choice picked is just too far outside the bounds of one's bare minimum acceptability.

Though it's cooperative, it really is another classic example of what non-collaboration looks like.  The party who engages in veto-or-not behaviour is purposefully, even if unintentionally due to ignorance, withholding information from the other parties.  That was clear in the previous post's parable where we saw how veto-or-not communicates exactly one bit of information, a true vs false, or 1 vs 0, etc.

2015-07-21

Group Preference Discovery: a parable of choosing movies


This is a parable from which we'll see elements of game theory and information content to forward an understanding about communication in a group.

A group of friends is deciding what movie to go watch.  To keep things simple, let's say the group is just of two people, Patrick and Sally.

Well, every time they go see a movie, Patrick asks Sally what movie she'd like to see.  Almost inevitably, Sally always defers back to Patrick to go see whatever he wants instead.  No matter how much Patrick tries to get her to pick or even make some of her own suggestions, she pretty well never does.  Once in a while, she may veto a movie Patrick chose or say that, after seeing the movie, that next time they should see something else for whatever reason (bad actor, terrible director, etc.).

Patrick is mostly fine with choosing, but does Sally realize that her not revealing her preferences for what she wants to see, it makes it next to impossible for Patrick to get to know her via getting to know what she likes, desires, and prefers absent other people's choices.

Patrick doesn't get to know her because by only ever vetoing or not-vetoing choices, she provides just one bit of information regarding any movie he decides on:  i.e. veto vs no-veto, true vs false, 1 vs 0. It's literally one bit of data.  Worse, Patrick can't even tell if a no-veto is due to her really liking a choice he made or if it's just barely passing by her very lowest minimum standards of movie watching.

2013-08-20

Where are the Canadian STEM students?

A while back I wrote with some details of Canadian educational attainment in Inflated expectations: Are students living in a dream? I've since become interested in the numbers of the so-called STEM fields (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) and thought I'd write a supplement to the old post.

Let's start with a highlight that stood out from the old post first. Based on the 2006 Canadian census, and focusing in on the 20 to 24 year old cohort: roughly 78% or so (based on statistics from ACT in Spring 2004, regarding the USA) of high school students expected to get a college or higher degree, but only 35.9% of the above cohort actually got anything of the sort.

I think the 2011 census is now available, but to keep the comparison focused on 2006 (I don't want to redo the old post), I will continue to cite numbers from the 2006 Census [1].

Looking at just the Canadian population between the ages of 20 to 24 years, by highest certificate, diploma or degree attained:

type of highest certificate, diploma or degree attainedtotal [2]% of cohort size
20-24 cohort, total size2,071,895100%
only a high school certificate or equivalent889,27542.9%
no certificate, diploma or degree at all286,05013.8%
some kind of post-secondary qualification (trades certificate, diploma below bachelor level, PhD, etc.)896,57543.3%
some kind of post-secondary qualification (trades certificate, diploma below bachelor level, PhD, etc.) in STEM fields258,30512.5%
some kind of university certificate, diploma or degree344,79516.6%
some kind of university certificate, diploma or degree in STEM fields87,0004.2%

Look at that, unemployment notwithstanding, the education "system" converted only 4.2% of the 20 to 24 cohort into STEM university credentialed workers after a long arduous process for the students involved.

Sure, the STEM university credentialed group represents 25.2% of all those who attained any university credentials at all, but it turns out in the context of the entire cohort, it's just a drop in the bucket. That is seriously concerning especially from an economics policy standpoint.

According to University Completion, "It has long been argued...university graduates, as a group, earn more, on average, than college graduates do", which might imply we ought to "sell" more university education, any university education. "However, recent research suggests the field of study may be more important...One study, for example, found that males with university degrees in academic disciplines—such as the humanities, education, biology, and agriculture science—earned less than half of that earned by males with university degrees in vocational and applied disciplines—such as commerce, medicine, and engineering" (ibid.).

So, not surprisingly, what field you study makes a difference! What's more, "Canadians with scientific degrees tend to earn more. Five years after graduation, engineers earn about $10,000 more annually than fine arts and humanities graduates, and upwards of $5,000 more than social science graduates. These earnings are in line with computer and physical sciences" (Percentage of Graduates in Science, Math, Computer Science, and Engineering).

What the research suggests, then, is that we ought to be "selling" more university education specifically in STEM and commerce fields. It's not just about helping students earn more money after graduation, but as I've noted in the past [3], the very fact the labour market provides greater incentive for a given occupation is evidence there isn't enough people entering that career path in the economy.

So let's get out there and sell more university STEM education!

Easier said than done, of course. Certainly for STEM fields, but to some extent for commerce fields as well (especially economics), a strong basis in math is a pre-requisite to success. That means to get more students into STEM and commerce fields, we may also have to get more students to learn more math and to learn it better as a pre-requisite — and that means high school math.

Therein, I'd argue, lies a big part of the problem with getting more students into STEM fields. It turns out high school math is hard, and getting more students to attain a high-level of math skills is also hard. In fact, "The proportion of Canadian [15 year old] students with high-level mathematics skills dropped slightly between 2003 and 2009" (Students With High-Level Math Skills) — that's six years of stagnation, if not decline.

So where are the Canadian STEM students? Don't be surprised you can't find them: literally over 95% of the 20 to 24 cohort just aren't into STEM.

[1] The numbers in the table were pulled from two Statistics Canada sources: Population 15 years and over by highest certificate, diploma or degree, by age groups (2006 Census), and Major Field of Study - Classification of Instructional Programs, 2000 (13), Highest Postsecondary Certificate, Diploma or Degree (12), Age Groups (10A) and Sex (3) for the Population 15 Years and Over With Postsecondary Studies of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, 2006 Census - 20% Sample Data.

[2] I should come clean and say that the numbers are off by five (5). I don't really know why, seeing the numbers are pulled straight from Statistics Canada. I assume it has something to do with the normalization adjustments they do to different tables, or some small error in counting. When the numbers are in the millions, I doubt being off by five is a big deal in this particular case.

[3] See Why push math education onto students?


2011-11-06

Inflated expectations: Are students living in a dream?

There's a big gap between what young adults expect versus what they really will get in their lives.

In terms of educational attainment, I think the vast majority of high school students in Canada expect to get a high school diploma, at the least.  A vast majority of them probably want to go to college too (78% according to ACT in Spring 2004, but that's in USA, though it's probably roughly similar in Canada).

But looking at just the Canadian population, between the ages of 20 to 24 years, by highest certificate, diploma or degree attained in 2006, we see that based on the 2006 Census, only:

  • 43.3% (896 570 out of 2 071 895) achieved some kind of post-secondary qualification (trades certificate, diploma below bachelor level, PhD, etc.)
  • 35.9% (744 375 out of 2 071 895) achieved some kind of college, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma, or university certificate, diploma or degree
  • 16.6% (344 795 out of 2 071 895) achieved some kind of university certificate, diploma or degree
  • 42.9% (889 275 out of 2 071 895) achieved only a high school certificate or equivalent
  • 13.8% (286 050 out of 2 071 895) achieved no certificate, diploma or degree at all
So roughly 78% or so expect to get a college or higher degree, but only 35.9% actually get anything of the sort.

2011-08-10

Dentist wants my money, so how can I trust him?

Much of dental treatments and examinations in BC and Alberta (Canada) are paid for in a fee for service model of business.  Increasingly, when I see a dentist, I notice they seem to be fairly eager at recommending me things that cost me money.  This issue has been bugging me for a long time.

For example, I'm told I should consider getting an electric toothbrush.  Incidentally, the dental office sells electric toothbrushes.

Another example: I'm told I grind my teeth at night and should get a night guard, even though my previous dentist, who saw me not months earlier, never diagnosed me as needing one.  When the dentist realized that my insurance doesn't cover getting their super expensive night guard, and that I'm unwilling to pay out of pocket, the dentist suggested I get a cheap one from a drug store, but to make sure to come back to the dental office to get it fitted by them (presumably the fitting will cost either me or the insurance company).  Incidentally, the previous dentist was older and probably had no debt, but the new dentist is younger and probably has debts to pay off.

There are other examples of these kinds of up-selling type behaviour, and I'm growing increasingly skeptical.  How can I know whether my dentist is telling me X because he really has my best interest in mind, when I know X will line his pocket with my money?  Worse is that I'm not even remotely qualified to know whether X really is in my best interest or not.

I don't want to get into a debate about what health delivery and payment system is best.  I just wanted to note that in the current system of dentistry, it's hard to ever trust that the dentist is thinking of me instead of my money.

Of course, this latest research suggests that there's no question: the doc is thinking of my money.